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JURISPRUDENTIAL RESPONSES
TO LEGAL REALISM
Richard Posnert
The last time I attended a Federalist Society Symposium was
four years ago, almost to the day. On that occasion I talked about
two terms in legal debate, restraint and activism, which seemed to
me to have become all-purpose terms of condemnation and approbation, respectivelya-and, really, to have lost all definite meaning. I
tried to suggest how they might be used more precisely. I am going
to do the same thing today with legal realism and legal formalism,
and also relate these terms to economics and to the rule of law and
suggest how these four concepts fit together nicely when one is talking about the common law but not so nicely when one is talking
about statutory and constitutional interpretation.'
The terms "formalism" and "realism," as they are currently
used in legal debate, are entirely polemical. They are epithets used
for a promiscuous variety of good and bad things, depending on the
purposes of the speaker. Formalism can mean anything from casuistry to fidelity to law; realism anything from left-wing ideology to
pragmatic, intelligent, and epistemologically mature engagement
with the legal system.
These terms can be given precise, nonpejorative, non-polemical
meanings as follows. "Formalism" can be used simply to mean the
use of logic in legal reasoning. And there is, of course, a place for
logic in legal reasoning. If, for example, we have a rule that a contract is not enforceable unless supported by consideration, and a
contract is presented which is not supported by consideration, then
we can say as a matter of logic that it is unenforceable. "Realism"
can be used simply to mean the use of policy analysis in legal reasoning. We get the premises on which to perform the logical operations of formalism from notions of sound public policy. There is
nothing illegitimate about this; it has always been an important part
of law and it is indispensable for solving many legal problems.
Each of these concepts is susceptible of abuse. The characteristic abuse of formalism, of which Christopher Columbus Langdell is
t Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. A.B. 1959, Yale; LL.B. 1962, Harvard University.
I For a complete discussion see Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 179 (1987).
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frequently accused, sometimes with justice, is that of smuggling policy choices into the premises for logical reasoning without analysis
or even acknowledgement, so that the law is made to seem to have a
more logical structure than it really has. Consider this question of
perennial fascination to students of contract law: should a person
be allowed to claim, as a matter of contractual entitlement, a reward
for returning a lost article, if he did not actually know that a reward
had been offered? Langdell said no. And he said it on logical
grounds: a contract requires-is defined to require-conscious acceptance; if the person who returned the lost property did not know
about the reward he could not have accepted that unilateral offer,
and therefore there is no duty to reward this person. Langdell's
mistake was to impose a definition on the word "contract" without
considering why one might want to make some promises and not
others enforceable and what the effect of making this promise enforceable would be. Would it lead to more returns or fewer? Actually this is a difficult question but it is one that Langdell thought he
did not even have to consider.
The vice of legal realism-of some versions of realism, anyway-is that it is, in a sense, not realistic enough. It leaves out of the
picture some important policy considerations. For example, in one
brand of legal realism, it was said that decision according to precedent was either not in fact used by judges in reaching decisions or
ought not be used. But the decision to defer to prior decisions is
itself an important and valid policy which a sensible and disciplined
judge would use in his decisional process even if he thought of himself as thoroughly realistic.
What I have proposed, then, is a system of analysis that has a
place for concepts and logical deduction but also a place for using
policy analysis to create the premises for decision. And from this
description it should be apparent that economic analysis fits very
nicely into a concept of law which combines formalism and realism.
Economic theory is a logical theory-indeed, a branch of applied
logic-and although the premises are supplied by notions about
human behavior-how people respond to incentives, for exampleand about what is valued in society, once those premises are given,
economic theory can be used to deduce all sorts of results. These
parallel systems of thought, the legal and the economic, can be combined, and have been combined, for example in the Hand Formula, 2
which is a logical statement of the meaning of negligence and can be
used not only to deduce the outcomes of particular cases but to de2 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), for a
definition of the Hand Formula.
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duce all sorts of interesting doctrines. If you start with the Hand
Formula you can ask, if both injurer and victim are negligent should
the injurer be liable? By use of economic analysis and the Hand
Formula you would come up with a logical answer. This type of
analysis, in which economics is used to derive legal results, is I think
what common law judges have always done intuitively (perhaps today, more explicitly) and is consistent with what we think of as the
rule of law.
It is no accident that my examples have been drawn from common law and that my discussion so far has really been a discussion
of the common law. While I think that formalism, realism, economics, and fidelity to the law all cohere nicely when one is talking about
common law, when one switches attention to statutes and the Constitution one has a gap to leap, and none of the tools I have mentioned is of decisive assistance in leaping it. The gap is this: with a
constitution or a statute, the starting point for analysis has to be a
text rather than a concept. Now it may be possible-this is the modem approach to antitrust law-to derive from a text (the text of the
Sherman Act,3 for example) a concept such as economic efficiency,
and create from that concept a logical system of law, much like the
common law of torts or contracts. But there is always that initial
step of obtaining a concept from a text. And that is not a step to
which formalism or realism or economic theory can provide the key.
What we do when we interpret a text is not policy analysis and is not
a logical operation; it is not possible, I think, to talk sensibly of deduction from a text. The initial stage, which is interpretation, is a
mental process that is distinct from either weighing up pros and
cons as in policy analysis or manipulating the rules of logic.
I will give an example that was the subject of an exchange four
years ago between Professor Easterbrook, as he then was, and Professor Bator. (I missed Professor Peller's talk last night but he has
also participated in print in this debate.) It involves the clearest provision in the Constitution-that you have to be thirty-five years old
to be President. The question is, why is that clear? Suppose a
twenty-one-year old presents himself to the electorate, and a court
says, you are not eligible. Do we reason that one must be thirty-five
to be President, you are not thirty-five, therefore you are not eligible-i.e., do we reason syllogistically? Do we say that it would just
be a bad thing for twenty-one-year olds to be eligible? Or do we, in
fact, have to go through a different mental process to decide that
this person is ineligible? I think the last suggestion is the correct
one. What this text means looks clear to us because we live in a
3

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
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certain society-fortunately in this respect unchanged in the last two
hundred years-that has certain assumptions and ways of doing
business. We live in a society, for example, in which birthdays are
recorded, in which it is agreed at what point one starts counting
people's ages, in which the use of arbitrary deadlines is commonplace-for example, in statutes of limitations-and given this culture in which we live, and have lived for two hundred years, it
becomes obvious what the framers had in mind in using this form of
words. They did not mean that only mature people could run for
President. They meant that you had to be thirty-five years old measured from birth. If we lived in India, where birth is measured from
conception, then even though English is an official language of India
the provision would mean something different. If we lived in a society that did not record birthdates, or in a society like the ancient
Greek in which numbers of years are used in a symbolic rather than
exact fashion, or in a society in which it was just unheard of to impose rigid deadlines in serious matters and loose standards were always used to decide important questions, then this "clear" text
might well mean something else.
But the provision is not clear by virtue of logic and it is not clear
by virtue of a weighing up of pros and cons, although that is indirectly involved. So we have this hump to get over in dealing with
texts-the problem of interpretation. We can, in the way I have suggested, identify some clear texts. Unfortunately, most of the ones
that we are interested in, or that generate litigation, are unclear, and
there is very little agreement on a method of interpretation of unclear texts.
What I described earlier as legal formalism in the common law
sphere resembles certain approaches to interpretation, such as textualism and intentionalism, in that they assign a modest role to the
judge, that of translator or logical manipulator, rather than that of a
policy analyst. But that I think is the only resemblance. I do not
think it is possible to be a formalist in interpretation without embarking on the unedifying course of using terms like formalism and
realism in an undisciplined fashion. And similarly, while the legal
realists may resemble the non-interpretivists in assigning an aggressive role to judges, nevertheless what is involved in dealing with a
text and what is involved in dealing with a common law policy question are profoundly different.
My conclusion is that when we talk about the common law, we
can, with a little closer attention to terms, discuss legal reasoning in
a way that should command broad agreement about principles,
though not about details of application. But when we move into the
constitutional and statutory sphere, we are in a different arena, deal-
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ing with a very different problem, that of interpretation, on which
legal analysts have made little progress.

